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STATEMENT OF FACTS1)

In their Brief, Appellees admitted they did not address all of the

arguments in Appellants' Opening Brief. [Appellees' Brf., @ page 2]
Appellees did not address the following arguments:

A)

Marshaling the Evidence - The trial court's failure to marshal

sufficient evidence so that a reviewing court could conduct a meaningful
review. [Appellants' Brief, @ pages 1 & 2] Since Appellees do not contest
Appellants' argument that the Ruling and Order is insufficient in providing
this reviewing Court enough information for a meaningful review, the Court
should view Appellees' silence as their being in agreement that the Record is
deficient.

The Appellants' other arguments addressed to the trial court's errors in:

B)

using findings and conclusions from a different lawsuit with different
plaintiffs against Appellants. [Appellants' Brief, @ pages 2, 3 & 4]

C)

making unsupported "conclusions" against Appellants.
[Appellants' Brief, @ pages 4 thru 12]

D)

not finding the earlier Puttuck 1 settlement a "favorable termination."
[Appellants' Brief, @ pages 22 thru 27]

Appellants assert that in not opposing those arguments this Court should
find that:

• Appellees have no evidence or arguments to defeat said arguments,
• The Appellants' arguments on these issues stand before the court,
uncontested, and,

Accordingly, Appellants should prevail on these issues.
RECORD CORRECTIONAppellees assert that:
Puttuck's wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of
process claims are based entirely on his assertion that the
Gendrons wrongfully filed and pursued counterclaims
against him in Puttuck 1. ... There are no other allegations
of wrongdoing,

[Appellees' Brf., @ page 4]

This is error. Appellants claimed Defendant Peter Gendron lied under oath
to support the counterclaims.
Record - Complaint, @ paras 30, 31, 37, 38, 42 & 47.
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ARGUMENTSW R O N G F U L USE C I V I L
and A B U S E OF P R O C E S S -

PROCEEDINGS

Appellees state:
... Any assertion that the fictional counterclaims were without
merit would have been required to have been asserted in that
case and would have been extinguished by the settlement and
dismissal with prejudice of Puttuck 1.
[Appellees' Brf., @ page 4]

The facts substantiate that Puttuck 1 had been concluded before Appellants
discovered the falsity of the counterclaims. They had no reason to believe
that the counterclaims were false and that Defendant Peter Gendron perjured
himself at his 02/23/00 deposition until he testified in the Hale deposition in
November '03. By then Puttuck 1 was closed.

Record, Complaint, @ paras 30, 35-38, 42, 47, Opposition, pages 3-4, 8,
&10.

The California Civil Code has a section entitled: Maxims of Jurisprudence.
One such maxim says:
The law never requires impossibilities.
CA. Civil C.,@ 3531
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It was impossible for Appellants to have asserted their abuse of process and
perjury claims against Defendants until the evidence, the perjured testimony
to support these claims existed. It first existed after Puttuck 1 was closed so
it could not have been asserted in Puttuck 1.

Utah has a contract statute, U.C.A., 78-11-8 directly on point:
Successive actions may be maintained upon the same contract
or transaction when ever, after a former action, a new cause
of action arises therefrom.

This law is not equivocal. It specifically provides for "a new cause of action
after a former action rising under the same contract. " This is exactly what
is present here.

EARLIER

RELEASE-

In reviewing the "Stipulated Motion and Order for Dismissal" under Puttuck
1, there is no mention in that stipulation barring any new claims that could
arise in the future.

Record -Appellees' Addendum, pages 34-36. This

stipulation precludes Appellees' argument that if the counter counterclaims
were without merit those claims "would have been required to have been
asserted in that case and would have been extinguished by the settlement
and dismissal with prejudice of Puttuck 1. "
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F A C T D E T E R M I N A T I O N SIf there is a question of when Appellants "discovered or should have
discovered" the falsity of the counterclaims and Defendant Gendron's
perjured testimony, that "question" is a factual questions and properly must
await a jury's determination.

CIVIL CONSPIRACY&
O B S T R U C T I O N OF J U S T I C E In citing Cline II, Appellees state:
When a statute makes certain acts unlawful and provides
criminal penalties for such acts, but does not specifically
provide for a private cause of action, we generally will
not create such a private right of action.

The Utah code provides criminal penalties for ....
obstruction of justice and perjury but does not provide
for a private right of action for any of those acts.
[Appellees' Brf., @ 5]

Appellants assert that this rule of construction is error because:
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A-

when enacting our criminal laws, our legislature is not necessarily
simultaneously focusing on "specifically" providing civil
remedies under criminal codes. This is especially true when there
are several other codes for legislating various civil remedies.

Moreover,
B-

Few, if any, of our criminal statutes specifically provide for
civil remedies. For example, DUI is a crime and when a
DUI driver causes injury he/she is subject to civil liability.
The DUI statute however, does not provide any specific
civil remedy for such civil lawsuits.
[See U.C.A. 41-6a-502, et. seq.]

Likewise, our assault statutes do not specifically provide for a
civil remedy but civil assault and battery actions have proceeded
through our court system forever.
[See, U.C.A., 76-5-101, et seq.]

Appellants are aware of U.C.A., 31A-26-301 as a statute directly
addressing a private cause of action. At subsection 5, it says: This
section does not create a private cause of action. Likewise, U.C.A.
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13-25(a)-107 specifically provides for a private cause of action under
the Telephone & Facsimile Solicitation Act.

Appellants assert that to, "infer that by their silence about a civil
remedy in a criminal statute that the legislature's intentions were not
to provide a civil remedy" directly contradicts the plain meaning of
31A-26-301 wherein the legislature saw fit to actually say there is no
private cause of action and 13-25(a)-107 where it directly created one.
These statutes prove that when the legislature wants to preclude or
include a private cause of action, it specifically does so by clear
language.

C-

if the legislature is silent on a criminal statute in addressing
a civil remedy, Appellants believe that the silence properly
should be interpreted as providing for a civil remedy. That
is, it should be only when a criminal statute specifically denies a civil
remedy should the courts find no civil remedy.

Appellants believes this because:

1In such statutes, it will be abundantly clear that the legislature
had civil remedies on their mind when enacting the criminal statute.
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2-

Many criminal statutes do not specifically address a civil

remedy and yet, historically, in practice there are attendant civil
causes of action.

3-

The idea of finding that something not specified in a criminal

statute is nevertheless present therein notwithstanding its absence,
[here a civil cause of action], contradicts many a case law finding.

The holdings in Harmon City v. Nielson & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162,
1168, [Utah, 1995] and in Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 [Utah,
1995] strongly suggest the opposite.

That is, if, on occasion, the legislature saw fit to address a civil cause
of action either by denying it or approving it in a criminal statute this
shows that in that instance the legislature had the civil question on its
collective mind and addressed it. This is in difference to inferring
from a criminal statute that is totally silent of any mention of a civil
question means that there is no civil cause of action.

Harmon City and Neel said:
Each term in a statute was used advisedly.
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While it is understandable that our legislature intentionally chose each
term and provision of a statute, it simply does not follow that the
absence of a provision was intentional and specifically means
something not said. A basic tenant of criminal jurisprudence is that
the defendant's silence must not be, cannot be, construed against
him/her. That same principle should be followed here. Silence
should not be construed as an assertion.

At page 1170, Harmon City said:
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect
to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute
was meant to achieve [citation omitted] To discover that
intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute, we
assume that i(each term of the statute was used advisedly; thus
the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused or inoperable, [citation omitted] Only
when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain meaning need
we seek guidance from legislative history and relevant policy
considerations.
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Under Harmon City, the court's approach to interpreting a statute is
clear. The operative factors are:

a-

what is the intent of the statute?
In a criminal statute, the intent is to address criminal
wrongdoings and to provide criminal penalties. There is no
intent in a criminal statute to address civil law.

b-

looking at the plain language.
To look at the plain language is to look at what the statute
actually says - not to look at what is not mentioned.

o

read the words literally.
"Read the words literally" means read the words. If there are
no words there is nothing to read. The court should not read
into what is not said.

d-

if the statute is ambiguous, seek guidance in its legislative
history.
A statute that makes no mention of any civil issues in not
ambiguous. Without any ambiguity, the court has no need to
even go to its legislative history. In Cline II, the court is going
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well beyond the statute's legislative history and into making
unwarranted "assumptions."

To assume that in a criminal statute, the absence of any mention of a
civil cause of action or remedy means that there is no such civil
remedy violates the foundation rules of all statutory construction.
When our legislature advisedly chooses certain terms in a law, it is
imagination to assign meaning to an issue not addressed in any way in
the statute.

And because:
4-

Another Maxim of Jurisprudence says:
For every wrong there is a remedy.
CA. Civil C. @ 3523

To interpret our statutes in this light would be in keeping with the
"open courts" provisions of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section
11, which mandates that injured person shall have a remedy ... and
shall not be barred from prosecuting any civil cause of action. Said
provisions are also in keeping with the U.S. Constitution's "open
courts" provisions.
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This constitutional provision clearly mandates that if a person is
injured they shall have remedy through a civil cause of action.
"Shall" is a mandatory term. A criminal statute does not provide an
injured person a "civil cause of action." A criminal statute gives the
State and her citizens a remedy but that is not a remedy for he who is
injured.

It is true that statutes can be enacted that abrogate certain causes of action or
remedies. This direct abrogation of a cause of action or remedy however, is
not with restrictions. That is, if a statute affirmatively abrogates a cause of
action or remedy it violates the "open courts" provision unless the statute or
other law:
1-

provides an injured person an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy by due course of law; and,

2-

if there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided,
the abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be
justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil
to be eliminated and elimination of existing legal remedy
is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving
the objective.
Hirpa v. IHC, 948 P.2d 785 [Utah, 1197]
Woods v. U. of U. Med, Cntr., 67 P.3d 436 [Utah, 2002]
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Appellants argue that when a statute directly abrogates a cause of
action or remedy it must satisfy the certain rigid guidelines of Hirpa
and Woods. Yet, instantly, we find the law and the courts circumventing these constitutional mandates when the court infers that a
criminal statute completely silent on a civil cause of action or remedy
means the legislature intentionally abrogated the civil causes of action
or remedies through that silence. This is patently wrong. Such an
inference violates the Constitution at Article 1, Section 11.

To assume a criminal statute provides no civil remedy leaves an
injured party without an effective and reasonable alternative remedy.
Likewise, such an assumption has no justification in eliminating any
clear social or economic evil Clearly, such an assumption is both
arbitrary and unreasonable.

The practice of assuming there is no civil cause of action or remedy in
a silent criminal statute blatantly abuses the criteria of Hirpa and
Woods and the rights of the State's citizens.

Finally, to fail to provide a civil remedy is to indirectly provide an
unlegislated immunity for wrongdoers. To fail to provide a remedy,
to provide immunity is to aid and abet wrongdoers.
13

CIVIL

CONSPIRACY-

Appellees argue:
There is no assertion William knew Peter's testimony to be false
or that the two of them planned for Peter to testify falsely. Therefore Puttuck failed to plead an essential element of civil conspiracy5
Appellees' Brf., @ 6

This is manifest error. To quote Plaintiffs/Appellants' Complaint:

30)

Defendant PETER, while under oath, testified falsely about said

counter-claims
At this time Defendant WILLIAM knew Defendant
PETER was testifying falsely.
31)

Defendant WILLIAM had ample opportunities to discredit or disavow

Defendant PETER5s false testimony but he failed and refused to do so. Due
to his silence Plaintiffs assert he ratified and acquiesced in the false
testimony and approved of Defendant PETER's false testimony.

37)

.... Accordingly, Plaintiffs assert Defendant WILLIAM knowingly

adopted and ratified the false testimony and
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38)

.... Defendant PETER testified falsely and Defendant WILLIAM

approved of said false testimony to hinder the prosecution of Plaintiffs'
claims and to intimidate Plaintiffs.

42)

.... Defendant WILLIAM approved of the false testimony,....

Given Defendant WILLIAM'S failure and refusal to disavow the false
testimony full well always knowing said testimony was false, his conduct
manifested his knowing approval and ratification of the false testimony.

47)

Plaintiffs believe Defendants conspired between themselves:

1- to wrongfully use the civil processes, 2- to commit perjury, 3- to
obstruct justice, and, 4- to abuse the civil processes.
Record - Complaint, @ pages 6 to 10.

Clearly, Appellants have alleged Defendants William and Peter Gendron
knowingly conspired to obstruct justice, to wrongfully use and abuse the
civil processes by filing false counter claims and then having Peter lie in his
deposition about the counter-claims.
*******

[Note: Appellees' reliance on the Waddoups case is in error as that was a
summary judgment motion where the standard of proof was different
because discovery had commenced. [Appellees' Brf., @ page 6,]]
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A M E N D I N G C O M P L A I N TAppellees assert that because Appellants did not formally move the trial
court with a memorandum of points and authorities, the trial court was
justified in denying the "motion" to amend. Appellees' Brf, @ pages 8-9
Appellants voice the follow objections to that conclusion.

1-

Before the trial court rules on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has no

way of knowing if any amendment will be necessary nor exactly what the
court will find deficient in the complaint. A plaintiff cannot amend without
knowing what needs to be amended. And what needed to be amended
was not discovered until after the trial court issued its Ruling and Order.
Again, the law never requires impossibilities. And to make a motion to
amend before a court rules on the sufficiency of the complaint under a
motion to dismiss is to ask for the impossible, e.g., to predict the future
through formal points and authorities.

2-

Appellants "motion to amend" made in concluding his "Memo of

Points and Authorities in their Opposition to Defendants' Motion To
Dismiss, was not really a "motion" to amend but rather a request for permission to file a motion to amend after Appellants became aware of just what
the trial court found [might find] deficient. Record, Opposition, page 13.
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3Appellees cite case law for the holding that a formal motion to amend
together with formal points and authorities are necessary to:

a-

mitigate the prejudice to the adverse party by allowing that party
to respond to the motion;

b-

assure that the court is appraised of the basis for the motion and
rule upon it with a proper understanding of the motion; and to,

c-

permit the court to ascertain what changes are sought and whether
justice so requires the amendment of the pleading.
Appellees' Brf., @ page 8-9

Instantly, through the motion to dismiss, all these conditions were met
through the Defendants' moving and reply statement of facts and
memorandum of points and authorities, Plaintiffs' written Opposition and
the parties' oral arguments. That is:

a-

Clearly, Appellees offense in bringing their motion to dismiss they
argued what they though to be all of the deficiencies in the Complaint.
Thus, with moving, opposing and reply papers there is no prejudice
because both parties are having a full opportunity "to respond. "

b-

by the parties moving and opposing papers and oral arguments, the
Court "was appraised of the basis for the motion ", and the Court's
Ruling and Order shows the Court had a "proper understanding of the
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motion " for the Court's findings "created" the issues that needed
amending.

c-

Through the Court's Ruling and Order, it was aware of exactly what
changes would be sought. Obviously, the changes would be those the
Court found insufficient. And,

d-

The Court found the "motion to amend" not warranted because its
Ruling and Order reflected it believed Plaintiffs could not state any
valid causes of action, so justice did not require an amendment to the
pleading.

Record - Ruling & Order, @ 90 & 95

Appellants believe that where the reason is the same the rule should be the
same. That is, in this instance all of the reasoning underlying a formal
motion to amend was met through the motion to dismiss.

4-

The trial court did not deny Appellants' motion/request for permission

to amend based upon the lack of a formal motion and written points and
authorities. It denied permission to amend because it said under no
circumstances could Plaintiffs plead a valid cause[s] of action. Appellants
could not properly plead their claim,,, these claims ... are without merit and
must be dismissed. Record - Order, @ pages 15-18 But under the
18

governing law, the Record need to show to a certainty that under no set of
facts could Plaintiffs prevail.

Dismissal of defendant's counterclaim was reversed because the
record did not persuade the appeals court that there was no set of
facts under which defendant might succeed. Olson v. Park-CraigOlson, 815 P.2d 1356, 1362 [10] [Ut. Ct. App., 1991]

A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) will be affirmed only
if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to
relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of its
claims. Heiner v. S. J, Groves & Sons, 790 P.2d 107, 110 [Ut. Ct.
App., 1990]; Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 [Utah, 1991]

The Record is so deficient it cannot be said to a certainty the there are no set
of facts Plaintiffs could prove that would state a valid cause of action. For
example:

Appellees assert Plaintiff cannot prevail on their "wrongful use of a civil
proceeding and abuse of process claims " because the Complaint did not
name the Defendants' company, LRG as a defendant itself Appellees' Brf.,

19

page 3. But, given permission to amend and naming LRG as a defendant
cures this deficiency. Would that not be in the interests of justice?

Notwithstanding the above argument, if the defendants were the real party in
interest behind the false counterclaims and committed/permitted perjury to
support them, then as principals, officers and directors who ratified the false
counterclaim via the perjury, they would be liable.

STATUTE

OF L I M I T A T I O N S -

Appellees assert that:
Puttuck failed to plead any facts establishing the
discovery Rule applied to toll the statute of limitations.
Appellees' Brf., page 8

This is another error. In addressing the question of''establishing facts to toll
the statute of limitation" the Record says:

a-

tolling applies if:
• the defendant misled or concealed the claimant.
Appellants have alleged Defendant Peter Gendron committed
perjury at his deposition. Surely, lying under oath is to
"mislead or conceal."
Sew v. Security Title Co, 902 P.2d 629, 637 [13]; citing
Warren v. Provo, 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 [Utah, 1992]
20

Additionally, under the Statement of Facts, Plaintiff Complaint says:
During the earlier, Puttuck v. Gendron lawsuit [filed 02/24/99] and before
the Hale -v- Gendron lawsuit, Defendants asserted a $500,000 counter claim
against Puttuck. At this time, Peter Gendron testified the $500,000 counterclaim was due Plaintiff Puttuck's mismanagement. He testified he put the
counter-claims together. This case finally settled in Puttuck's favor.
Record, Complaint, @ paras 8-13

Almost 4 years after Puttuck sued the Gendrons, Hale sued the Gendons
[12/27/02]. Defendants asserted a $500,000 counter claim against Hale. At
this time, in Nov. '03 deposition, Peter Gendron testified the $500,000
counterclaim was due Plaintiff Hale's mismanagement. He testified he put
the counter-claims together. The time frame when the defendants incurred
the Hale mismanagement costs substantially overlapped the time defendants
counter-claims accused Puttuck of mismanagement.
Record, Complaint, @ paras 14-19
Peter Gendron5s second deposition in November of 03, was the first time
Appellants could have discovered the falsity about the earlier counterclaims
against them. Prior to that, Appellants could have/may have believed the
claims to be a mistake but had no inkling they were perjury based until
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November '03. Even in '03, Appellants knew only that there was
significantly different under-oath testimony concerning the same
counterclaims. But when Peter Gendron testified at the Hale trial in
conformity with his '03 deposition testimony, then it was clear he had
perjured himself years earlier in the Puttuck deposition.
Record, Opposition, @ 11, Transcript @ 12

Understandably, one cannot allege perjury until on notice of the perjury.
That first notice occurred in November, '03. Appellants filed the instant
Complaint on 03/12/07, clearly within the 4 years of the "happening of the
last event necessary to complete the cause of action."

CONCLUSIONAppellants believe that this Court must reverse the trial court's Ruling and
Order because:

1-

All the causes of action plead first arose after Puttuck 1 was
concluded. Successive causes of action are permitted by law.
At dismissal of Puttuck 1, there was no surrender of future
causes of action that might arise.
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2-

Questions t)f when a cause of action was discovered or should have
been discovered is a factual determination warranting a jury
determination.

3-

The Utah Constitution requires injured persons be afforded a civil
remedy for the wrong/injury they suffer at the hand's of wrongdoers.

4-

Appellants have pled sufficient facts to put the defendants on notice of
the claims being asserted against them.

5-

The interests of justice required Appellants be afforded an opportunity
to amend their Complaint.

6-

The Record is void sufficient information for the trial court to have
found that there are no facts under which Appellants could plead to
make a valid cause[s] of action. And,

7-

Without knowing the thought or reasoning processes of the trial court,
this Court cannot do a meaningful review of the Record.

Accordingly, for the above-stated reasons, this Court must reverse the trial
court's Ruling and Order.

Date: 17, March 2008

\ RfeMctfully submitted;
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